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FULL DISCLOSURE, MARKET DISCIPLINE,
AND RISK TAKING: RETHINKING
CONFIDENTIALITY IN BANK
REGULATION
James R. Doty
David C. Mahaffey
Miriam J. Goldstein*
INTRODUCTION
The activities that make up the business of banking have undergone
major transformations in the last fifty years. These changes, particularly
those of the past two decades, have been extensively described elsewhere'
and need only be summarized here. Inflation in the 1970s and early
1980s, which prompted the elimination of government controls on inter-
est rates paid by banks and thrifts,2 had a significant impact on the opera-
tions of the U.S. banking system, so too did technological advances and
the internationalization of financial services markets. Cross-industry
* Mr. Doty (B.A. Rice University, 1962, A.B. Oxford University, 1964, J.D. Yale Law
School, 1969) is General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Mr. Mahaffey (A.B.
Prnceton University, 1979, J.D. Harvard Law School, 1982) is Assistant General Counsel and Ms.
Goldstein (B.A. Yale University, 1981, J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1985) is Senior
Counsel in the SEC Office of the General Counsel.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the authors' colleagues on
the staff of the Commission.
I. See, e.g., Banking Regulators' Report on Capital Standards, Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 97-131 (1990) (statement of
Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE
COMPETITIVE BANKS 1-18 to 1-27 (1991) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]; U.S. General Account-
ing Office, Rep. No. GGD-91-26, DEPOSIT INSURANCE: A STRATEGY FOR REFORM 30-31 (1991)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]; LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS
FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 53-81 (1991); David R. Fischel et a]., The Regulation of
Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301, 303-04 (1987); Richard C. Breeden,
Reforming Regulation of Financial Services in the United States: Issues and Opportunities, 20 INT'L
LAW. 775, 775-77 (1986); Stephen J. Friedman & Connie M. Friesen, A New Paradigm for Financial
Regulation: Getting from Here to There, 43 MD. L. REV. 413, 428-33 (1984).
2. See 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988).
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competition introduced new providers of financial services and non-tradi-
tional financial instruments to the banking system.
While the business of banking has undergone a dramatic transforma-
tion, the basic structure of this country's bank regulatory system has not.
Today, our bank regulatory framework is largely unchanged from the
structure laid out in the 1930s and modified by the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956 (BHCA).3 We still rely on a framework built around
the New Deal assumption that pervasive, detailed regulation of bank ac-
tivities is required to protect the system against bank panics, or "runs." 4
Over the past decade, unfortunately, traditional bank regulation has
not prevented the unprecedented failures of banks and thrifts.5 It is ap-
propriate, on the basis of this record, to ask whether, and to what extent,
shortcomings in our bank regulatory system may have contributed to
these failures.
In this Article, we focus on one specific defect that has, in our view,
weakened our banking system: the premise that banks, unlike other
companies, must be shielded from market discipline. This assumption,
which lies at the heart of traditional U.S. bank regulation, explains why,
historically, the public disclosure of bank financial information has been
so narrowly constrained, while other public companies have been subject
to more extensive disclosure requirements-and to more effective market
discipline.
We believe it is time to relinquish the view that bank regulation should
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988).
4. See generally Alfred Dennis Mathewson, From Confidential Supervision to Market Disci-
pline: The Role of Disclosure in the Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J. CORP. L. 139, 140-42
(1986); Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Deregu-
latory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 501, 509 (1989); Fischel, supra note 1, at 301-03.
5. From 1985 through 1988, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)
resolved 454 thrift insolvencies. EDWARD J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT
HAPPEN? 26 (1989). Thrift insolvencies accelerated still further as the decade closed: a 17-month
period from August 1989 through December 1990 saw 531 thrifts fail, representing approximately
$271 billion in assets. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 30. The General Accounting Office (GAO)
has estimated that, on a present value basis, the thrift crisis already has cost taxpayers approximately
10% of the value of all insured thrift deposits that existed at the end of 1986. Id. at 31. By contrast,
GAO notes, "the level of loss suffered during the Great Depression by depositors in commercial
banks before the deposit insurance system was enacted is estimated to have been 1 percent of total
deposits." Id. (footnote omitted).
The commercial banking industry has fared only slightly better than the thrift industry. From
1985 through 1989, the FDIC closed or gave financial assistance to 896 insured banks. Id. at 31, 42.
These banks had $109 billion in assets; the FDIC's costs in connection with the resolution of these
institutions are estimated at $17 billion. Id.
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avoid full disclosure and market discipline. The United States should
replace its existing system of over-protective bank regulation with a sys-
tem modeled on the federal securities laws, with full disclosure the key-
stone of the new structure. Strict capital standards6 and vigilant
regulatory supervision7 must of course play a continuing and prominent
role in the new system. But any new bank regulatory scheme also should
recognize the critical importance of market discipline to the control of
bank risk-taking.
In Part I of this Article, we briefly discuss the principle of disclosure as
embodied in the federal securities laws. In Part II, we summarize the
role of disclosure in present-day bank regulation. Finally, in Part III, we
discuss how the disclosure principles of the federal securities laws would
operate when incorporated into the regulation of the banking industry.
I. THE PRINCIPLES OF FULL DISCLOSURE EMBODIED IN THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The rise of the modem corporation in the early decades of this century
transformed the relationship between business enterprises and their
shareholders. As corporations grew, stockholders became more numer-
ous and more widely dispersed. Corporate ownership no longer gave the
shareholders effective control of the corporate entity.' A leading analysis
of the time noted that:
separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the inter-
ests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and
where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of
power disappear.... By the use of the open market for securities, each of
these corporations assumes obligations towards the investing public which
transform it from a legal method clothing the rule of a few individuals into
an institution at least nominally serving investors who have embarked their
funds in its enterprise.9
6. For a discussion of the role of capital standards, see Breeden, supra note 1, at 780-81;
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at II-1. For a different view of the importance of bank capital as
a regulatory tool, see GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 83.
7. For a discussion of the need for prompt regulatory intervention, see generally TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 1, at ix; GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
8. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932). "[A] large body of security holders [was] created who exercise virtu-
ally no control over the wealth which they or their predecessors in interest ... contributed to the
enterprise." Id. at 5.
9. Id. at 6.
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This corporate revolution provided both the background and the impe-
tus for the federal securities laws. In the period following the close of
World War I, fraudulent practices in the securities markets led to the
flotation of almost $25 billion in worthless stocks and bonds.' 0 Not sur-
prisingly, this appalling record raised concerns in Congress and else-
where about the manner in which investment bankers conducted their
business-questions about the availability of information on security is-
suers, the nondisclosure of investment bankers' commissions, and the ef-
fect of questionable investment banking practices on the allocation of
credit." Clearly, prospective investors needed means to obtain adequate
information to permit informed decisions regarding investment in new
issues of securities. 12
Congress thus had to restructure "the relations between the corpora-
tion as managed by the group in control, and those who hold participa-
tions in it-its stockholders, bondholders, and, to some extent, its other
creditors."' 3 Various competing approaches were proposed. One group
favored legislation restricted to antifraud provisions, fearing that
broader, preventive legislation would impede legitimate businesses. 14 An
opposing school urged "merit" legislation, mandating substantive federal
evaluation of the terms of particular securities offerings.' 5
In the end, neither of these approaches prevailed. Instead, the princi-
ple of "disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure"' 6 formed
10. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1933).
11. See id. See generally Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE
BANKERS USE IT (1932). Other problems were diagnosed as well:
the common law limitations upon civil recovery [by injured investors]; the inadequacy of
current information concerning companies with publicly held securities; the abuse of the
proxy device by self-perpetuating managements; the abuse by corporate "insiders" of their
favored position in order to trade in their corporations' securities for their own profit; the
"private club" atmosphere of the Nation's securities exchanges; the ease with which the
securities markets could be manipulated; the lack of financial safeguards for brokers and
dealers; the disproportionate amount of the Nation's available credit which at times was
channeled into the securities markets at the expense, it was thought, of direct financing of
commerce and industry; the practices of protective committees in corporate reorganiza.
tions; the abuses of the holding company and the investment company devices; and the
irresponsibility of trustees under corporate bond indentures.
1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 26 (3d ed. 1989) (footnote omitted).
12. 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 178.
13. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 8, at 7.
14. i LoSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 171.
15. Id. at 171-72.
16. Id. at 27.
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the foundation of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).17 Congress
had evidently heeded the message of President Roosevelt:
There is... an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securi-
ties to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity
and information, and that no essentially important element attending the
issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor the further doc-
trine, "Let the seller also beware." It puts the burden of telling the whole
truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest dealing in securities
and thereby bring back public confidence.
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the
least possible interference to honest business. t8
As the preamble of the final legislation provided, the Securities Act was
designed to "provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities
sold" to the investing public.19
The Securities Act requires the preparation of a registration statement
and a prospectus, containing accurate and adequate information, in con-
nection with each public offering of securities. Issuers must furnish the
prospectus to investors and file it with the government.20 Issuers, their
directors, underwriters, lawyers, and accountants may be held civilly lia-
ble for material misstatements or omissions in registration statements.
President Roosevelt, in his 1933 message to Congress, noted that the
Securities Act was just a start. "[L]egislation relating to the better super-
17. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1988)).
18. 77 Cong. Rec. 937 (1933) (message from President Roosevelt on the regulation of securities
issues, presented to the Senate, Mar. 29, 1933). Rejecting the concept of merit regulation, President
Roosevelt noted that, "[o]f course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action
which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the
sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit."
Id.
19. Preamble to the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74. Professor Harry Shulman, writing shortly after
the legislation's passage, commented that the Securities Act "requires a picture not simply of the
show window, but of the entire store. It requires not simply truth in the statements volunteered, but
disclosure. And, for false statement, it provides civil liability." Harry Shulman, Civil Liability and
the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 242 (1933).
20. Louis Brandeis had earlier called for this essential element of the statutory scheme, writing:
[There] must be a disclosure to the investor. It will not suffice to require merely the filing of
a statement of facts with the Commissioner of Corporations or with a score of other offi-
cials, federal and state ...
To be effective, knowledge of the facts must be actually brought home to the investor,
and this can best be done by requiring the facts to be stated in good, large type in every
notice, circular, letter and advertisement inviting the investor to purchase.
BRANDEIS, supra note 11, at 104 (emphasis added).
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vision of the purchase and sale of all property dealt in on exchanges, and
legislation to correct unethical and unsafe practices on the part of officers
and directors of banks and other corporations" was needed to supple-
ment the provisions relating to new issues of securities.2 ' Commentaters
expressed particular concern over shareholders' inability to require cor-
porate management to provide information about the finances and condi-
tion of the corporation on an ongoing basis.22
In response to these needs, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) as a further step toward "improv[ing] the
position of the average investor by obtaining for him better information
about securities."'23 The Exchange Act requires that issuers provide in-
formation concerning already-issued securities, comparable to the infor-
mation the Securities Act requires for new issues of securities.24 Under
the Exchange Act, issuers of securities that are the subject of an effective
registration statement also become subject to certain periodic reporting
requirements. Periodic reporting is also required under the Exchange
Act for issuers whose securities are listed on a national securities ex-
change.25 To enforce these requirements, the Exchange Act created the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 26
Congress, in crafting the federal securities laws, avoided both over-
regulation (which could have resulted from adopting a scheme of merit
regulation) and under-regulation. Recognizing the impossibility of
preventing all business failures, Congress did not attempt to remove all
risk from the investment markets.27 Instead, in order to protect the in-
vesting public without either placing undue obstacles in the way of "hon-
21. President's Message, supra note 18.
22. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 18, at 317.
23. John Hanna & Edgar Turlington, Protection of the Public Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 251, 276 (1935). See also John N.M. Moore & Frank M. Wiseman, Market
Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. CH. L. REV. 46 (1934); Roland L. Redmond, The Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. An Experiment in Administrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 622, 624 (1938);
Comment, Confidential Treatment of Information Required by the Securities Exchange Act, 47 YALE
L.J. 790 (1938).
24. See, eg., Hanna & Turlington, supra note 23, at 277; Comment, supra note 23, at 791.
25. See Exchange Act §§ 12(a), 12(g)(1), 13(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), 781(g)(1), 78m(a) (1988).
Since 1964, of course, such reporting has been required only for issuers with $1,000,000 or more in
total assets and a class of equity securities held of record by 500 or more persons.
26. See id. § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1988).
27. "The SEC is not concerned that disclosure may cause a firm to fail or an entire industry to
suffer. The SEC's job is to ensure that investors are able to minimize the harm to themselves by
making informed investment decisions." Mathewson, supra note 4, at 158.
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est business,"" or providing government guarantees of particular
securities issues,29 Congress adopted a legislative scheme based on the
principle of full disclosure. This disclosure policy, in the decades since
its adoption, "has become so well established, it is generally regarded as
the appropriate or inevitable method of regulating corporate finance.",
30
II. THE LIMITED ROLE OF DISCLOSURE IN PRESENT-DAY
BANK REGULATION
A. The Principle of "Confidential Supervision"
Traditional bank regulation, as Professor Mathewson has observed, re-
lies on "confidential supervision" and pervasive regulation, rather than
on public disclosure and market discipline.3 1
[T]raditional bank regulatory systems have not used public disclosure of
information regarding a bank's affairs to depositors and potential deposi-
tors, i.e., the public, as a major means of achieving regulatory goals. In-
stead, bank regulatory systems have been paternalistic in nature. Bank
regulatory policy does not question the premise that a bank's affairs must be
monitored, but because depositors cannot be trusted to act responsibly
upon learning adverse information, the task of oversight lies with bank reg-
ulatory agencies.
Confidential supervision and bank examinations form the cornerstone of
the paternalistic approach. "Confidential supervision" means ... the con-
trol of the flow of information regarding a bank's affairs by the bank regula-
tors through restrictions on the quantity of information made available to
the public and controls on the timing of the availability of the information
that is released. Confidential supervision has meant more than the confi-
dentiality of bank examination reports. Although some public disclosure is
permitted, e.g., publication of call reports, banks traditionally have not
been required by regulatory laws to make additional disclosures, and bank
regulators have fostered an environment that has tolerated the discretion of
banks in releasing information to the public.
32
Under this system, information about a bank's condition flows to the
regulators rather than to the public. Because bank regulators narrowly
28. President's Message, supra note 18.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 10, at 4.
30. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 40 (1982).
31. Mathewson, supra note 4, at 140-41.
32. Id. at 140-41 (footnotes omitted).
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control the public dissemination of such information, banks are to a great
degree insulated from the market discipline that shareholders or deposi-
tors otherwise might exercise. The tasks of controlling banks' excessive
risk-taking and correcting unsafe or unsound bank practices are left
largely to regulatory means.33 In the performance of these tasks, the
bank regulators rely extensively on prophylactic regulations, including
restrictions on bank business activities and ownership, minimum capital
requirements, and lending limits.3 4 Bank examinations and enforcement
actions against banks, of course, play an important role as well. 35
As Professor Mathewson notes, Congress has not mandated this sys-
tem of confidential supervision.36 While the federal banking statutes pro-
vide for the confidentiality of bank examination reports, 37 nowhere do
they establish a general rule promoting confidentiality over public disclo-
sure of bank information. Rather, the federal banking regulators created
"confidential supervision" with the aim of preventing bank runs38 and
out of a mistrust of the public's ability to evaluate information pertaining
to bank condition.39
33. See Albert J. Boro, Jr., Comment, Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative
Behavior, 74 CAL. L. REv. 431, 457 (1986).
34. See Fischel, supra note 1, at 301; Boro, supra note 33, at 439-40.
35. See Boro, supra note 33, at 440.
36. See Mathewson, supra note 4, at 146. "Congress, however, has accepted implicitly and
countenanced explicitly, but has not ordered, confidential supervision." Id.
37. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988); cf. 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.18(c), 261.11(g), 350.9 (1991).
38. See Boro, supra note 33, at 434, 435-44.
39. See, eg., Overby v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158, 161 n.2 (5th Cir.
1955) (Affidavit of A.N. Overby, Acting Secretary of the Treasury) (cited in Mathewson, supra note
4, at 140 n.7 ("Reports of examination of national banks contain much information which, at the
very least, if revealed to the public, would be misunderstood owing to inability to evaluate the rela-
tive importance of the matters criticized and discussed. This could not fail to adversely affect the
banks concerned.")).
Supporters of the tradition of confidential supervision argue that retail depositors do not need
information about the financial condition of their banks---"deposit insurance removels] any 'invest-
ment' aspect of the deposit instruments." Friedman & Friesen, supra note 1, at 455. With the
increasing significance of uninsured deposits and institutional, nonretail depositors, however, this
argument has lost much of whatever force it may once have commanded. See id. See also GAO
REPORT, supra note 1, at 27, 98, 157-58 (estimating that uninsured deposits and other nondeposit
liabilities fund approximately 40% of the assets of all U.S. banks, and noting that time deposits
exceeding the insurance limit amount to $409 billion, or approximately 14.7% of total funds on
deposit); id. at 161 (noting that one class of institutional depositors-private pension funds-holds
approximately $92.1 billion in time deposits over $100,000, or 15.5% of total uninsured deposits in
U.S. depository institutions). Many of the proposals currently under consideration in Congress
would give an even greater role to uninsured deposits. For example, the Treasury's proposed legisla-
tion would provide for more stringent calculation of the $100,000 limit on insured deposits main-
tained at one institution, eliminate deposit insurance for brokered deposits, limit pass-through
[Vol. 69:1117
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Notwithstanding the historical bias in favor of confidential regulation,
banks and thrifts are not wholly exempt from the obligation publicly to
disclose financial and other significant information affecting their opera-
tions. For example, banks must file, and the public may obtain access to,
both quarterly reports of condition and income-"call reports"-and
Uniform Bank Performance Reports.' However,
the primary purpose for requiring publication of call reports is not to pro-
vide information to depositors and prospective depositors to use in deciding
whether to make a deposit or leave a deposit in the bank; the purpose is to
periodically demonstrate to the public that the bank is financially healthy
and thus preserve confidence in the banking system.41
In addition to the disclosure requirements imposed by banking law,
certain banking organizations are required under the federal securities
laws publicly to disclose their financial condition. Publicly owned bank
holding companies and thrift holding companies are subject to the re-
porting requirements of the Exchange Act, as interpreted and enforced
by the SEC.42 Publicly owned banks and thrifts that are not part of hold-
ing companies are also subject to Exchange Act reporting requirements.
Under section 12(i) of the Exchange Act, however, these banks and
thrifts must file their reports with federal banking regulators rather than
with the SEC. 4 3
A number of factors undercut the value of the Exchange Act's report-
ing requirements as a means of ensuring public disclosure of bank finan-
cial information. First is the bifurcation of responsibility for the
interpretation and enforcement of these requirements. Currently, the
SEC reviews the disclosure statements of roughly 13,500 public compa-
nies, including 1,400 bank and thrift holding companies. Four separate
bank regulatory agencies-the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
deposit insurance, and, more generally, mandate the "least cost resolution" of failed depository insti-
tutions. See S. 713, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
40. See 12 U.S.C. § 161 (1988) (national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1988) (insured state non-
member banks); 12 U.S.C. § 324 (1988) (member banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(v) (1988) (federal savings
associations). See generally 49 Fed. Reg. 26,809-10 (1984). Even this limited disclosure is quite
recent. See MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY 303 (1990).
41. Mathewson, supra note 4, at 144-45 (footnote omitted).
42. See Exchange Act § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1988).
43. Id. § 12(i), 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1988). As Professor Mathewson has shown, the debates over
§ 12(i) provide a snapshot of the various conventional arguments in favor of nondisclosure as a
means of preserving effective bank regulation and preventing bank runs. See Mathewson, supra note
4, at 151-60. In 1964, Congress resolved the issue by subjecting banks to Exchange Act disclosure
requirements, but at the same time vesting authority over such disclosures in the banking regulators.
1991] 1125
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serve System (Federal Reserve), the FDIC, the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)-regulate the
disclosure statements of some 700 publicly held banks and thrifts. With
multiple regulators enforcing Exchange Act disclosure requirements,
regulatory overlap and redundancies occur. Moreover, the banking regu-
lators need not follow the SEC's interpretations of the Exchange Act dis-
closure requirements.' Thus, discrepancies arise in both the
interpretation and the application of the statutory standards, leading to
confusion and disparate treatment of financial institutions based upon
their type of charters.45
For example, the SEC has long required that Exchange Act periodic
reports include audited financial statements.4" The OCC, however, re-
quires only verified financial statements in connection with the periodic
reports that national banks file pursuant to Exchange Act section 12(i).
The principal accounting officer and internal auditor of the reporting
bank, rather than an independent auditor, may provide the necessary
verification.47 Similarly, until December 14, 1990, the FDIC allowed
state nonmember banks to include merely verified financial statements in
their periodic reports.4"
The federal banking regulators and the SEC differ in the levels of detail
they require in describing the reporting entity's business. The SEC re-
quires a bank or thrift holding company to disclose various statistics re-
lating to loans, deposits, investments, yields, average rates of return, risk
elements, and an analysis of the allowance for loan losses in the "De-
scription of Business" sections of its annual report.49 The OCC and the
Federal Reserve, however, do not require statistical disclosure in Ex-
44.
In carrying out their responsibilities under this subsection .... [the banking agencies] shall
issue substantially similar regulations to regulations and rules issued by the Commission
... unless they find that implementation of substantially similar regulations with respect to
insured banks and insured institutions are not necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for protection of investors.
Exchange Act § 12(i), 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1988).
45. See, eg., Banking Regulator's Report on Capital Standards, supra note 1, at 13-29 (testi-
mony of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission); BLUEPRINT
FOR REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TAsK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 29-
30, 64, 91 (1984).
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-01(a) (1991).
47. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 11.910, 11.902 (1991).:
48. See 54 Fed. Reg. 53,572 (1989).
49. See Industry Guide 3, reprinted in I FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 3827.
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change Act reports that the banks they supervise file. 50
Second, the limited applicability of Exchange Act reporting require-
ments to banking organizations also undermines the extent to which
those requirements can ensure full disclosure. Only 1,100 bank holding
companies and fewer than 300 thrift holding companies are required to
file periodic reports with the SEC. 5 Only 700 banks and thrifts must file
Exchange Act reports with their respective federal banking regulators. 52
Yet, as of June 30, 1990, there were nearly 16,000 banks and thrifts in the
United States.53 Clearly, a large percentage of banking organizations es-
cape Exchange Act disclosure requirements by virtue of their ownership
structures. The information the Exchange Act requires may, as to these
banks, simply be unavailable to the public.
In addition to the limited applicability of the securities disclosure re-
quirements, Exchange Act reports are not disseminated broadly. The
Exchange Act entitles only shareholders to receive the periodic disclo-
sures. While securities analysts use Exchange Act disclosures in prepar-
ing research reports, these reports are primarily written for, and read by,
securities investors. Neither the Exchange Act nor federal banking law
requires banks to furnish copies of securities-type disclosures or the in-
formation contained in their call reports to their depositors. 54 As a re-
sult, depositors typically have access to less information regarding the
condition of their banks than do investors in other publicly held compa-
nies. Depositors, therefore, are less able to influence the banks that hold
their money, thus generally lessening market discipline.
In response to the inconsistencies and inefficiencies that Exchange Act
section 12(i) creates, two authoritative studies conducted over the course
of the last seven years have recommended consolidating in the SEC re-
sponsibility for the securities disclosures of all banks and thrifts.5 5 There
is considerable support for these recommendations on Capitol Hill. In
50. See Letter from Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, to Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, "Responses" attachment at 6-7 (May 10, 1991) (available from
authors).
51. See id. at 2.
52, See id. at 15.
53. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
54. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL GUAR-
ANTEE MARKET: THE USE OF THE EXEMPTION IN SECTION 3(a)(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933 FOR SECURITIES GUARANTEED BY BANKS AND THE USE OF INSURANCE POLICIES TO GUAR-
ANTEE DEBT SECURITIES 96 (1987).
55. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 59; BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 45, at
28, 64. See also S. 713, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 242(f) (1991).
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addition to the Treasury Department's original legislative proposal for
comprehensive financial services modernization, at least three major bills
pending in Congress at the time this Article went to press would repeal
section 12(i).56 The sponsors of these bills generally would agree that
"[b]y centralizing regulatory responsibility" for bank and thrift securities
disclosure in the SEC, repeal of section 12(i) would "help to ensure that
investors in the securities of banks and savings associations receive the
benefit of full and fair disclosure under the [Exchange] Act."'57
These bills fail, however, to extend to depositors the benefits of the type
of disclosure required under the Exchange Act. If market discipline is to
assume a broader role in bank regulation-as we recommend in the bal-
ance of this Article-depositors, no less than investors, must have access
to full financial information about the banks that hold their money.
Without complete data, depositors cannot make informed decisions
about the banks in which they leave their money. If depositors cannot
exercise market discipline, regulatory oversight remains the sole means
of checking excessive risk-taking and abusive bank practices. This check
is inevitably far less effective than if regulatory oversight were combined
with market discipline.
B. The Need for Market Discipline as a Supplement to Traditional
Bank Regulation
Five years ago, Professor Mathewson observed that traditional bank
regulation, emphasizing confidential supervision, had failed to prevent
and may have contributed to the escalation of bank failures and the in-
creased exposure of the federal deposit insurance funds.5" Events since
1986 have only confirmed this conclusion. Bank and thrift failures accel-
erated and FSLIC reserves were depleted, leaving the FDIC insurance
funds in need of a massive infusion of money by the end of fiscal 1991.19
56. See Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, H.R. 6, reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 157, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and
Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, S. 543, reprinted in S. REP. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991);
Securities Regulatory Equality Act of 1991, H.R. 797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
57. 137 Cong. Rec. E414, E417 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1991) (statement of Rep. Dingell, a sponsor of
H.R. 797).
58. See Mathewson, supra note 4, at 163.
59. The Administration has asked Congress for $80 billion to continue the savings and loan
cleanup, and $70 billion to recapitalize the Bank Insurance Fund. See, e.g., Testimony of Nicholas
F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman of the Oversight Board of the Resolution Trust
Corporation, before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (June 26, 1991) at 4
($80 billion in RTC re-funding); Testimony of L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC, before the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/5
CONFIDENTIALITY IN BANK REGULATION
A number of factors contributed to the bank regulatory system's fail-
ure to maintain stability (the goal cited to justify the principle of confi-
dential supervision). First was the close identification of some officials-
primarily, thrift regulators-with the industry for whose oversight they
were charged.' Indeed, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
was responsible for both the promotion and the regulation of the thrift
industry.61 At the same time, the FHLBB also was responsible for pro-
tecting the federal savings and loan insurance funds and for reviewing the
financial statements supplied to potential investors by thrifts seeking new
capital.62 Torn between these conflicting responsibilities, and unable to
absorb the costs of liquidating all the insolvent thrifts, the FHLBB
sought to maintain the aura of industry stability and thrift profitability
through efforts to keep insolvent thrifts in operation.
Critical to the effort to mask problems at insured thrifts was the mis-
use or disregard of accounting standards and disclosure requirements.
The creation of "appraised equity capital" provides one example. Guide-
lines the FHLBB established in 1982 permitted thrifts to include, for pur-
poses of calculating their net worth, the amount of unrealized
appreciation in the value of certain capital assets that was above the de-
preciated costs of those assets. 63 The rule was a permissive, one-way pro-
vision: thrifts were not simultaneously required to recognize unrealized
declines in the value of their other capital assets.6" The FHLBB was
frank about its aims in promulgating this rule. "[G]iven the industry's
present difficulties in gaining access to the traditional capital markets,
and the need to maintain public confidence in the industry during this
period of financial and operational transition," the FHLBB deemed it
appropriate to "depart[ ] from past [FHLBB] policy and generally ac-
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (Apr. 30, 1991), at 45-46 ($70 billion in loans to the Bank
Insurance Fund).
60. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 40, at 32 ("Throughout the 1970s, . . . the three-member
Federal Home Loan Bank Board tended to be cheerleaders more than supervisors"); Jonathan R.
Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 99 OHIo ST. L.J. 1277, 1280, 1284-87 (1989);
Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline By Depositors: A Summary of the
Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 221-22 (1988).
61. See generally MAYER, supra note 40, at 32.
62. See Richard C. Breeden, Thumbs on the Scale: The Role That Accounting Practices Played
in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S71, S80 (forthcoming).
63. See 47 Fed. Reg. 52,961 (Nov. 24, 1982); Breeden, supra note 62, at S80; MAYER, supra
note 40, at 70.
64. See Breeden, supra note 62, at S80.
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cepted accounting principles" and to adopt the rule.6 The FHLBB thus
admitted its intent to lull investors into a sense of confidence that the
institution's true condition did not warrant-the very antithesis of full
disclosure. 6
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
198967 (FIRREA) did much to alleviate the first of these problems. It
replaced the FHLBB with the OTS and clearly defined the mandate of
the new agency as a regulatory-and not a promotional-function. In
addition, FIRREA expressed a renewed commitment to provide bank
regulators with needed resources.
FIRREA, however, did not resolve all of the flaws of our system of
banking regulation. Importantly, FIRREA did not sufficiently enhance
disclosure or the role of market discipline in bank regulation.68 Instead,
it continued the existing model of bank regulation, with its emphasis on
pervasive regulation of banks' business activities.
One problem with that model is the fact that "[d]etailed regulation
that attempts to influence the day-to-day operation of a business is often
impossible to administer effectively."' 69 In addition, many of the prophy-
lactic restrictions bank regulators relied on in the detailed, day-to-day
regulation of the industry were designed to address issues other than
bank safety.70 Some of the provisions that "bar banks from particular
activities or investments rather than simply [regulating] the conduct of
65. 47 Fed. Reg. at 52,962; see Breeden, supra note 62, at S80.
66. If more proof were needed, it could be found in the FHLBB's warning:
[I]nstitutions should be aware that the use of financial statements in connection with the
public offer and sale of securities which depart in a significant manner from those prepared
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, such as those which might
include amounts for appraised equity capital, may raise questions under the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. Accordingly, institutions subject to such limitations should refrain from public
dissemination of financial statements ... which include items such as amounts of appraised
equity capital which are not consistent with the requirements of generally accepted ac-
counting principles.
47 Fed. Reg. at 52,964.
67. Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 301, 401, 103 Stat. 183, 277-282, 354 (codified at 12 U.SC.A.
§§ 1461-63, 1437 (West 1990)).
68. FIRREA required the federal banking agencies to adopt uniform accounting principles,
and also required the disclosure of enforcement actions taken against banks. Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§§ 913, 1215, 103 Stat. 183, 483-484, 529 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1818(u), 1833d (Vest 1990)).
69. Garten, supra note 4, at 547.
70. See, eg., Macey, supra note 60, at 1291 (Glass-Steagall Act restrictions on combinations of
the banking and investment banking businesses); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank
Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1170, 1213
(1988) (branching, interstate banking, and antitakeover restrictions).
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those activities" may instead increase bank vulnerability by handicapping
bank competitiveness and foreclosing the diversification of various
risks.7 1 Moreover, even those prophylactic rules designed to protect
bank safety and soundness may not effectively restrain risky behavior,
since they apply uniformly to all banks-sound institutions as well as
undercapitalized and reckless ones.72
The prevailing philosophy of nondisclosure, and the resulting elimina-
tion of market incentives, bears a large measure of responsibility for the
regulatory failures of the past decade. The policy of confidential supervi-
sion allows bank management to conceal excessive and inefficient risk-
taking, while insulating itself from market discipline-allowing deposits
and capital to flow to banking organizations that an informed public
would have shunned.73
III. INCORPORATING THE PRINCIPLE OF FULL DISCLOSURE IN A
NEW BANK REGULATORY SYSTEM
Recent developments and the problems of traditional bank regulation
have led many commentators and regulators to conclude that Congress
must reform the traditional regulatory model to allow for more market
discipline of banks.74 Adverse incentives "rig the regulatory game hope-
lessly in favor of risky bankers," making it highly unlikely that tradi-
tional regulatory supervision will alone prevent excessive risk taking.75
Depositors, on the other hand, particularly depositors with uninsured
funds at risk,76 have the incentive to protect their funds by controlling
bank risk taking.77
Providing depositor discipline depends in considerable part on deposit
71. Garten, supra note 4, at 509. See also id. at 507, 525; TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at
1-16; Fischel, supra note 1, at 319-21; Macey & Miller, supra note 70, at 1169-71.
72. Macey & Garrett, supra note 60, at 222-23.
73. See Boro, supra note 33, at 459, 462.
74. For regulatory perspectives, see, e.g., TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-10; 50 Fed.
Reg. 20,609 (1985) ("As the regulatory restrictions which had previously constrained bank actions
are removed, the market takes on greater importance as a mechanism for promoting sound bank
management and reducing the potential for inappropriate or abusive behavior by encouraging funds
flows to the vast majority of banks that are prudently operated. Thus, the availability of relevant
information is essential to an evaluation of bank condition and the effectiveness of the resulting
market discipline."). For other commentary, see, e.g., Macey & Garrett, supra note 60; Mathewson,
supra note 4; Boro, supra note 33.
75. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-9. See also id. at 111-27 to 111-28.
76. See discussion infra notes 79, 80.
77. See, e.g., Mathewson, supra note 4, at 167.
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insurance reform and modification of the "too big to fail" policy. 71 Un-
less depositors have money at risk, they have little incentive to monitor
the condition of their banks. 9 The creation of those incentives is thus an
essential element of banking reform.80
The other key ingredient for successful depositor discipline is full and
accurate information."1 Only with access to adequate information will
depositors have the ability to monitor the soundness of their banks and to
exercise discipline on an ongoing basis.
"Adequate information," for these purposes, means information that
meets at least three criteria. First, the information disclosed to the public
must be prepared according to meaningful accounting standards and
presented in a form that is understandable and readily comparable to the
information that competitors provide. Second, the information must be
made easily accessible to depositors. As Louis Brandeis noted seventy-
five years ago, simply requiring filings with a government agency is not
enough; the information must be "brought home" to those directly con-
cerned.82 Finally, the regulated firms must provide the information on a
regular basis. Sporadic disclosure leads to rumors that can have a partic-
ularly destabilizing effect. "[I]naccurate information may crowd out ac-
curate information,"83 and runs on the disclosing bank, or even on banks
78. See, e.g., TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-10, 111-20 to 111-27, 111-29 to 111-31;
Macey & Garrett, supra note 60, at 223, 237.
79. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at III; Macey & Garrett, supra note 60, at 215. Of
course, uninsured funds already make up a significant portion of total bank deposits in the U.S. See
supra note 39. Thus, even in the absence of new limitations on the scope of the federal safety net, a
sizeable group of depositors already have incentives to exercise market discipline over their banks.
80. A number of reforms could encourage greater depositor monitoring of bank health-among
them, imposing mandatory losses of a specified percentage, or "haircuts," on depositors with ac-
counts in excess of the insurance limit. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-13 to 111-27.
The creation of such depositor incentives to monitor the riskiness of their banks is a subject outside
the scope of this Article.
81. "Increased depositor discipline resulting from eliminating coverage of uninsured depositors
... would simply be after-the-fact discipline, which already exists." TREASURY REPORT, supra note
1, at 111-35. Notwithstanding this concern, the Treasury Department has focused almost exclusively
on the "moral hazard" problem-the reduction in depositors' incentives to monitor the condition of
their institutions attributable to the existence of deposit insurance. The Treasury more or less ig-
nores the question of depositors' ability to conduct such monitoring. As a result, the Treasury's
legislative proposals emphasize direct limitations on the federal safety net, but do little to expand
disclosure requirements as a means to enhance market discipline.
82. See discussion supra note 20.
83. Helen A. Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1159, 1186 (1989). See also
50 Fed. Reg. 20,609, 20,614 (1985) ("The FDIC recognizes that public confidence in the banking
system as a whole must be preserved and that incomplete and misleading disclosures may cause
irreparable harm to individual institutions.").
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unrelated to the subject of the rumor, are more likely to result.8 4 The
largest depositors may be the quickest to withdraw their money. "Given
the fiduciary duty of some institutional investors to protect their funds,
and the many investment options available to such funds, managers are
unlikely to leave them in a potentially risky bank." 5
Mandating full and regular disclosure will not prevent all bank fail-
ures. Protecting every bank from failure has not been and should not be
the goal. To the contrary, earlier, rather than later, failure of an unsound
bank is probably desirable: the resolution costs are most likely lower
earlier in the process.86
The broader goal-maintaining a stable banking system---is served by
providing for ongoing and accurate disclosure of bank information.
With full and regular disclosure, depositor discipline could work at a
number of levels, and would not have to take the form of sudden bank
runs.87 At earlier stages, depositors may well demand higher rates of
return on funds they place with riskier banks. Banks with stronger capi-
tal positions should be able to raise capital at lower rates, however, thus
saving money and offsetting the systemic costs that riskier banks create.88
Because higher interest rates on deposits mean lower rates of return for
shareholders, shareholders also would have an incentive to force bank
management to reduce risks.89
More generally, the public would gain confidence in the accuracy of
bank-provided information and become less susceptible to rumors.90 De-
84, See, eg., Mathewson, supra note 4, at 176 ("If a bank fails as a result of a rumor-created
run, depositors may speculate that the entire banking system is not telling the truth. Fearing the
unsoundness of the entire system, depositors may withdraw funds from the system itself, rather than
merely transfer funds from one institution to another.").
85. Boro, supra note 33, at 461 (footnotes omitted).
86. See Macey & Miller, supra note 70, at 1195 ("the evidence strongly indicates that bank
runs occur to banks that deserve such treatment by their depositors. Consequently, the widespread
withdrawal of funds by depositors should be viewed as a healthy occurrence, not as a sign of market
failure, because such runs demonstrate that depositors are monitoring the banks in which their de-
posits are kept.") (footnote omitted).
87. See id. at 1193-99; Macey & Garrett, supra note 60, at 228-36. But see Helen A. Garten,
Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 130-
32 (1986); Garten, supra note 83, at 1181-87 (1989) (questioning effectiveness of depositor discipline
through means other than bank runs).
88. See Macey & Miller, supra note 70, at 1196-98; Macey & Garrett, supra note 60, at 229.
89. See Macey & Miller, supra note 70, at 1197; Macey & Garrett, supra note 60, at 229.
90. Boro, supra note 33, at 483; 50 Fed. Reg. 20,609, 20,614 (1985) ("When the public's per-
ception that a bank is experiencing difficulties is not met with an adequate response, the informa-
tional void is filled by rumors and half-truths. Therefore, the systematic, dependable disclosure of
information will promote public confidence in banks and reduce the likelihood of deposit runs.").
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positors would be less likely to assume that bad news about one unsound
bank indicated problems in other, unrelated banks or in the banking sys-
tem generally. This enhanced willingness to distinguish between sound
and unsound banks would significantly reduce the likelihood of a genera-
lized bank panic.91 Moreover, providing information in a steady flow
would lessen the bombshell effect of bad news. As a result, the market
would have time to exercise discipline by means other than sudden, mass
withdrawals of deposits. 92
In addition, better disclosure would encourage bank management to
behave prudently, further reducing the exposure of the federal deposit
insurance system. "Bank managements would normally seek to avoid
disclosure by routinely working to identify emerging problems in their
institutions and taking appropriate remedial action on a timely basis." 93
Moreover, we question any assumption that enhanced disclosure re-
quirements would place U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage if
banks in other countries continue to follow a model of confidential regu-
lation. While the international competitiveness of U.S. banks is, of
course, a matter of great importance, those who predict adverse conse-
quences to U.S. banks from enhanced disclosure obligations should bear
the burden of substantiating their predictions.
This is particularly true where the goals of the reforms are as impor-
tant as they are in this instance, and where the chances are good that
other countries may follow our example and adopt similar requirements
for their own institutions. As U.S. accounting and disclosure standards
have constructivly influenced securities regulation abroad, we should not
be quick to abandon transparency as a guiding principle where the dis-
closure standards affect banking institutions.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. bank regulatory structure, dedicated to the preservation of
public confidence in the banking system, has long been based on the prin-
ciple of "confidential supervision." Traditional bank supervision has re-
91. See Boro, supra note 33, at 483; Macey & Miller, supra note 70 at 1159.
92. See Friedman & Friesen, supra note 1, at 457; Boro, supra note 33, at 448, 461.
On the other hand, a policy that disfavors the disclosure of adverse news and other information
may also perversely increase the likelihood of bank runs. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See also Mathewson, supra note 4, at 175-77; Boro, supra note 33, at 459.
93. 50 Fed. Reg. 20,609, 20,615 (1985) (discussion of proposed policy governing disclosure of
FDIC enforcement proceedings).
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lied on prophylactic regulation and the examination process, while
relieving banks of disclosure obligations and insulating them from mar-
ket discipline. In the past decade, however, the traditional bank regula-
tory system has failed to prevent an unprecedented number of bank
collapses. It is therefore necessary to re-evaluate the principle of nondis-
closure that lies at the heart of our bank regulatory system.
Underlying the various arguments for a policy of "confidential" bank
supervision is the implicit assumption that banks are somehow special,
and should be recognized as different from other corporate enterprises,"
because of their functions as deposit takers and credit intermediaries.
These functions, however, are no longer unique to banks. Instead, one of
banks' principal distinguishing features is the enormous commitment
that the federal government and U.S. taxpayers assume to back banks'
assets through federal deposit insurance.95 As a result, when confidential
bank regulation fails to prevent bank failures, taxpayers as well as deposi-
tors and bank investors bear the costs. 9
6
Given the "specialness" of banks-the public's stake in bank health,
attributable to taxpayer backing of deposit insurance-there is an obvi-
ous need to make bank regulation as effective as possible. The failure of
confidential supervision suggests that we must carve out a broader role
for market discipline in the control of bank risk taking. We do not sug-
gest eliminating all traditional regulatory tools. To the contrary, govern-
ment regulation, combined with full disclosure, is necessary to preserve
the public's confidence in the banking system.97 Depositor discipline,
however, in addition to full disclosure like that required for reporting
companies under the securities acts, can serve "as an important supple-
ment to the supervisory process."9' Congress should not overlook the
value of these tools in the course of the ongoing effort to modernize the
U.S. bank regulatory system.
94. See, eg, Macey & Miller, supra note 70, at 1156-65; see also E. Gerald Corrigan, FINAN-
CIAL MARKET STRUCTURE: A LONGER VIEW at 4-5, reprinted in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
NEW YORK ANNUAL REPORT (1987).
95. See Friedman & Friesen, supra note 1, at 427; Macey & Miller, supra note 70, at 1162.
96. Boro, supra note 33, at 459.
97. See Macey & Garrett, supra note 60, at 223; Boro, supra note 33, at 455-57.
98. 50 Fed. Reg. 20,609, 20,615 (1985).
1991] 1135
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/5
